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The New Refugee System: 
Success or Failure? 
by Howard Adelman 
It is too early to provide any 
definitive judgement on the success of 
the new legislation concerning refugee 
claimants made within Canada or at 
our border. After all, the legislation 
has only been in effect for five 
months. But it is not too early to take 
a preliminary reading. 
Two criteria for judging the 
system are fairness to genuine 
refugees and efficiency and cost 
effectiveness in processing claims. As 
a by-product of such efficiency, bogus 
claims will be dramatically 
discouraged, further ,enhancing the 
efficiency of the system. 
History 
The refugee support groups, 
which virtually unanimously opposed 
the new legislation, did agree that an 
efficient new system was needed 
which would provide a rapid 
turnaround time, thereby dis- 
couraging bogus claimants. But they 
bitterly fought the new legislation. 
There were three major grounds for 
their opposition. They were opposed 
to the Safe Third Country provision 
on which to judge whether an 
individual was eligible to make a 
claim; they advocated universal 
hearings and opposed the use of 
preliminary hearings to presort 
claims; finally, they wanted a review 
system to catch errors and to ensure 
similar standards for assessing claims 
were used across the country. 
The notion of a Safe Third 
Country provided that if a claimant 
arrived via a third country where the 
claimant could have made a refugee 
claim, the claimant would not have 
been eligible to make a claim in 
Canada. In the eventual legislation, 
the requirement provided that the 
claimant had to sojourn in that safe 
country for at least two days. Further, 
the Minister had assured the public 
that the Safe Third Country provision 
would not apply to specific groups of 
refugees where the countries in which 
the claimants had sojourned had a 
poor record of accepting claims. 
The legislation also provided for 
preliminary hearings to assess 
whether claimants were credible or 
eligible to even have a hearing. The 
legislation made no provision for a 
review system within the Refugee 
Board. 
As a result of the conflict over the 
legislation, the new legislation and its 
implementation was delayed at least 
two years. In the meanwhile, the 
number of cases coming to Canada 
more than doubled each year from a 
base of approximately 8,000 in 1986. 
The backlog grew to 115,000 cases 
with an open door to abuse the 
system. 
Has the government been proven 
correct in fighting so hard and long 
for the new legislation? 
Safe Country 
Before the system was 
introduced, the government shelved 
the Safe Country provision as 
unworkable. The major centre piece 
of the new legislation was abandoned 
before the system was even started. 
Preliminary Hearings 
The second major point of 
contention was the absence of full 
refugee hearings for every claimant 
before an independent Refugee Board. 
Instead, Preliminary Hearings were 
introduced to weed out non-credible 
and ineligible claimants. How has the 
Preliminary Hearing System worked? 
From January to May lst, of 2,806 
claimants, 2,504 were given 
preliminary hearings. Of these, 114 
(5 per cent) were withdrawn or 
abandoned and, of the remaining 
2,390,2,210 (93 per cent) were referred 
to a full hearing. Of those rejected, 2 
were not found to be eligible and 178 
were found not to have a credible 
claim. That is, the preliminary 
hearings end up eliminating only 7 
per cent of the claimants since one can 
presume the other 5 per cent of 
withdrawn or abandoned cases would 
have followed the same pattern 
whether they went to a preliminary 
hearing or to a full hearing. There is 
even a possibility more might be 
abandoned if they went directly to a 
full hearing. 
To eliminate 7 per cent of 
claimants processed (180 of 2,390) in a 
preliminary hearing, an expensive and 
cumbersome extra step in the refugee 
procedure was introduced. The extra 
cost of the Preliminary Hearing Stage 
is estimated to be at least $16 million 
for the government and $3,750,000 for 
the refugees or legal aid. 
The estimate is arrived at by 
several calculations. For example, if 
the cost of the refugee claims process 
is $100 million per year, if central 
office costs (library, communications, 
administration, etc.) are estimated at 
20 per cent, and if the preliminary 
hearings are even estimated to cost 
one fifth of the balance (half the time 
for half the number of cases), then the 
cost is about $16 million. Similarly, 
the cost can be calculated by 
estimating the time of an average 
hearing that is challenged and the 
overhead cost of interpreters, refugee 
board members, immigration officials 
or refugee hearing officers, etc. The 
estimated cost of the claims that go to 
a full preliminary hearing where there 
is a government challenge. is 
estimated at about $3,000 per hearing 
for an estimated 4,000 hearings, or a 
cost to the government of about $12 
million (excluding the legal costs of 
counsel to the refugee claimant) if the 
claims are restricted to one half a day 
per hearing. (In fact, some of the 
preliminary hearings are taking a full 
day and, in effect, have become 
refugee hearings, which, unfor- 
tunately, merely have to be repeated 
at the full refugee hearings which 
follow.) Further, if the other 4,000 
preliminary hearings in which no 
challenge takes place is also 
calculated at one-third of the cost of a 
full hearing, then this adds another $4 
million to the bill for a total of $16 
million. 
In other words, if only the 
estimated direct costs to the 
government of the preliminary 
hearings are taken into account (and 
not the indirect costs or the costs of 
postponed preliminary hearings or 
the costs incurred directly or 
indirectly by the refugee claimants), 
the cost to eliminate one refugee 
claimant from the system at the 
preliminary stage is about $28,500 
even if the hearings are completed in 
half a day. That is, if there are an 
estimated 8,000 hearings, and 7 per 
cent of these are eliminated (about 
560), and the direct costs of 
eliminating those claimants in 1989 is 
$16 million, then the direct cost per 
claim eliminated is $28,500. 
In addition, the Preliminary 
Hearing stage builds in the potential 
for a new backlog as about two-thirds 
of those challenged failed to get their 
hearing within the first month let 
alone within 48 hours of arrival as 
initially expected by the department. 
Refugee Board members have to hear 
the claims of almost half of those 
making claims twice, a terrible waste 
of very expensive personnel who 
could be spending their time giving 
refugees a full hearing, thereby 
speeding up the process. Further, of 
those who went to a preliminary 
hearing, postponements were 
presumably allowed to enable the 
refugees to arrange for counsel and/ 
or allow counsel to prepare their case, 
a time interval that would have been 
The Preliminary 
Hearing may go the 
way of the Safe 
Country Provision, 
and follow 
numerous Royal 
Enquiry Reports 
and obsolete or 
unworkable 
legislation onto 
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of history. 
sufficient to prepare for a full hearing. 
In other words, to eliminate only 7 per 
cent of claimants at a cost of $16 
million or $28,500 per claim without 
any significant saving in the 
processing time and with a potential 
to build a new backlog, an extra step 
was introduced which significantly 
slows down a system which depends 
on a fast turnaround time to 
discourage bogus claimants. 
The Preliminary System is costly. 
It has a low rate of effectiveness. 
Further, it may also be unfair. Of the 
claims rejected in the first month 
where we examined each of the claims 
rejected at the preliminary hearing 
stage, at least 2 and possibly 3 should 
not have been. An Ethiopian claimant 
was rejected; he not only had a prima 
facie credible case, but seems to have a 
provable case as  a Convention 
refugee. A claimant from China slit 
her wrists upon being rejected at the 
preliminary hearing; in subsequent 
news reports we read about some 
grisly details of her case, including the 
torture and death of a family member 
at  the hands of government 
authorities. She may not have a 
provable case as  a Convention 
refugee, but she appeared clearly to 
have at least a case that deserved a 
full hearing. Subsequently, on 
compassionate grounds, the Minister 
of Immigration allowed her to stay. 
Whether the refusal of the psychiatrist 
to release her to face a deportation 
hearing was a factor in this decision, 
we are unable to say. This means that 
on fairness grounds alone, if the first 
month provides any indication, there 
seems to have been an error rate of at 
least 10 per cent that we know of in 
the preliminary hearing stage, a very 
high rate of error when one 
understands that this process is about 
life and death issues. 
There are already hints that the 
government is considering shelving 
the Preliminary Hearings by 
gradually reducing the number of 
challenges and letting more and more 
of the claims go directly to a full 
hearing. The Preliminary Hearing 
may go the way of the Safe Country 
Provision, and follow numerous Royal 
Enquiry Reports and obsolete or 
unworkable legislation onto the dusty 
shelves of history. This would be a 
commendable de facto solution to an 
element of the legislation that is very 
costly, of little effect and which builds 
a potential for a new backlog quite 
aside from the considerations of 
unfairness. The Preliminary Hearing 
process could be kept as a reserve to 
handle cases of claimants from non- 
refugee producing countries, 
particularly if even small numbers 
begin to appear on Canada's doorstep. 
A Review System 
Then there will be only one major 
area of dispute with the refugee 
support groups across the country - 
the need for a review system. The 
elimination of the Safe Country 
provision would have been 
unworkable and a political 
embarrassment; it was eliminated 
because of its own inherent flaws and 
proved unnecessary in any case. The 
elimination of the Preliminary 
Hearing as a general procedure will 
result from its high cost and 
ineffectiveness, though the political 
embarrassment of some of the unjust 
decisions may also help bring about 
its reservation for very restrictive 
application. 
But a review system will not save 
money; it will cost money even if far 
less than the cost of the Preliminary 
Hearings. This change will be much 
harder to achieve. One cannot expect 
the government to capitulate on a 
point of pure fairness which costs 
money when it has so stubbornly 
clung to two flaws in the legislation, 
losing a very important two years, 
when those flaws were not only 
unfair, but costly, unworkable and 
inefficacious. 
The one possibility for intro- 
ducing a review is the political not the 
financial cost. These costs arise from 
two different sources. The most 
critical is the fate of the returnees 
rejected through the system. So far, 
three cases of returnees rejected by the 
refugee claims system have 
beenreported a s  possibly having 
suffered upon their return, though 
there is no direct evidence as yet. The 
second cost arises within the system 
itself if some political appointees to 
the Refugee Board prove to be weak 
and a potential source of 
embarrassment as a result of their 
pattern of decision making. Neither 
situation would be welcomed by the 
government or the Refugee Board. 
Whatever the critics may say of the 
government, it would be wrong to 
accuse the government of deliberately 
wanting any individuals to be 
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returned to their countries of origin if 
they end up being persecuted. For 
purposes of self protection, the 
Refugee Board may introduce its own 
internal review procedure. Though 
such a weak form of administrative 
review would not meet the claim for a 
full right of appeal on substantive 
grounds, it is likely to be the best that 
can be expected at this time. And if 
virtually no genuine refugees can be 
proven to have been refouled once 
such a system were in place, then this 
is as far as the improvements are likely 
to go in the foreseeable future. The 
pity is, these were precisely the 
elements in the compromise worked 
out by Jim Hawkes when he was the 
Tory Chairman of the House Standing 
Committee on Labour, Employment 
and Immigration in the previous 
Parliament. 
The Explanation 
If these changes are to come about, 
it is important to understand the 
reasons for these errors in the 
legislation. If the errors arose from an 
ideological bias by the Tory 
government against genuine refugees, 
then the changes are less likely to 
occur. If, however, they arose for 
other reasons, then alterations are 
more likely. That likelihood will be 
enhanced if the real source of the 
problem is identified and the correct 
strategy is adopted. 
A combination of three factors 
which had led the government to 
introduce the new legislation and 
alienate the entire non-government 
refugee support system has been 
suggested. First, a small core of Tory 
backbenchers, and the portion of the 
public supporting them, were 
antithetical to any refugees claiming 
refugee status within our borders. 
Their motives varied from an ethics of 
Me first, a desire to save money and to 
racist beliefs; their ideology was best 
expressed in the Nielsen report on 
immigration. Secondly, civil servants 
wanted to control the selection of 
those who came into Canada; they 
were not anti-refugee but were critical 
of a situation in which a large number 
of spontaneous arrivals threatened 
their ability to plan and control the 
numbers and types of individuals 
allowed to enter Canada. Thirdly, 
pragmatic politicians, who were also 
not anti-refugee, were responding to 
the backlash against the spontaneous 
arrivals as evidenced by the flood of 
critical mail received when less than 
200 Tamils arrived off the coast of 
Newfoundland. 
Just before Christmas, 
government immigration officers were 
sent a Christmas present. They were 
instructions ("the most important set 
they would read") describing the 
Program Delivery Strategy for 
implementing Bill C-55 and Bill C-84. 
Those instructions seem to confirm 
speculations about the intent of 
government civil servants who 
promoted and defended the new 
legisla tion. 
The Program Delivery Strategy in 
implementing Bills C-55 and C-84 
provides direct evidence to support 
the preeminence of the second motive 
and suggests it will be the most 
influential factor in the 
administration of the new laws. 
These most important instructions 
stress, in its own words, "control 
issues". "The Perfect Plan", as the 
Strategy asserts, "is not a plan at all. 
Rather it is an accounting exercise." 
The object of the exercise is to control 
the intake of numbers. What about 
protecting genuine refugees? 
The instructions assert that there 
are "two extremely important ideas 
contained in the strategy". The first 
asserts that the Commission wants 
"genuine refugee claimants to go to 
the new Immigration and Refugee 
Board". Note the innovative use of 
language. Previously, the Canadian 
public had been bombarded with a 
false dichotomy: genuine refugees 
were those whose claims were 
granted and all others who claimed 
refugee status were bogus. This was 
in spite of the fact that the govern- 
ment statistics suggested that there 
were three categories of refugee 
claimants, not two: successful refugee 
claimants (30 per cent) and unsuc- 
cessful claimants, the latter in turn 
dividing into bogus claimants (19 per 
cent) - those making fraudulent 
claims - and those coming from 
refugee producing situations in which 
they felt their lives were in danger but 
were unable to prove that danger 
represented a well founded fear that 
they, as individuals, were targeted for 
persecution. 
The Program Delivery Strategy 
applies this linguistic distortion to the 
preliminary hearing stage. The 
preliminary hearing is not (according 
to the instructions) designed to to sort 
out credible and eligible cases from 
non-credible and ineligible ones, 
preventing the clearly bogus 
claimants from obtaining a full 
hearing and ensuring that anyone 
with a credible case at all goes before 
the Refugee Board. .The instructions 
do not assert that, "We want all 
credible claims to go before the 
Refugee Board." They assert, "We 
want genuine refugee claimants to go to 
the new Immigration and Refugee 
Board". 
One can give these instructions a 
second reading. One could argue that 
they mean that the immigration staff 
are to be as helpful as possible in 
ensuring that all genuine refugee 
claimants go before the new Refugee 
Board, but others may be allowed to 
go as well. It is a possible reading. 
But the following factors suggests that 
it is not the intended meaning. First, 
no where in the instructions are 
officers told that their responsibility is 
not to determine who is a genuine 
refugee or not, but only to determine 
who has an eligible or credible case. 
Secondly, if officers are instructed to 
ensure that genuine refugees go before 
the Refugee Board, this implies that 
they have a responsibility for 
determining who is a genuine refugee 
and not simply determining who has 
a credible and eligible case. Thirdly, 
we can now understand why the 
lawyer defending the refugee claimant 
from mainland China, who slit her 
wrists when she was denied a hearing 
at the preliminary stage - in spite of 
the fact that she claimed her father 
had been murdered by the 
Communist regime - was shocked at 
the outcome. As he stated in an  
interview on the CBC, he thought he 
had only to produce enough evidence 
to prove the claimant had a credible 
claim; he did not think he had to 
prove at the preliminary hearing she 
was a genuine refugee and he blamed 
this erroneous assumption for the 
outcome of the preliminary hearing. 
The rejection of the Ethiopian refugee 
claimant who had a clear prima facie 
case as a refugee but had an  
inexperienced designated counsel to 
defend him at the preliminary hearing 
is another instance indicating that the 
two stage process is not one to sort out 
credible from non-credible claimants 
at the first stage, but to decide who is 
a genuine refugee. The assumption is 
that, as much as possible, all refugee 
claimants who go before the Board 
should be able to prove they are 
genuine refugees. Since, 93 per cent of 
the refugee claimants who had a full 
hearing received a favourable 
decision, the statistics support such a 
contention. This suggests that the 
preliminary hearings are, in fact, 
serving to select refugees and not just 
eliminate bogus claimants. 
But there is a fourth piece of 
evidence which is even clearer in 
suggesting that the immigration 
officers were being instructed to 
determine who is a genuine refugee 
and not just who is a credible and 
eligible claimant. The instructions 
project the statistics which will result 
from their strategy. Bissett predicts 
that after one year there will be a 60 
per cent decline in claims and that 
"there will be an out-take of 10 per 
cent at the front end of humanitarian 
and compassionate cases." This 
means that only 30 per cent of the 
historical number of claims will 
appear before the Refugee Board for a 
full hearing. This is precisely the 
percentage of traditional claimants 
who were able to prove that they were 
refugees. In other words, the intake 
into the Refugee claims system will be 
reduced by 70 per cent, the exact 
percentage of claimants who were 
unable to prove they were refugees. 
Not only would all bogus claimants 
be eliminated from the system. All 
other cases who have difficulties 
proving their claims, whether or not 
their claims are credible and whether 
or not they are eligible, will be 
eliminated from the system at the first 
stage. 
The second extremely important 
idea stressed throughout the 
instructions reinforces the 
interpretation that the main thrust of 
the top civil servants in the 
Immigration Department is to have 
control. As the introduction to the 
instructions conclude, "The main 
thing to remember is that we are in 
charge of this program and we intend 
to manage it." The main purpose is 
not to ensure that anyone with a 
credible and eligible claim gets a full 
and fair hearing. The main thing is 
not to ensure that the Refugee Board 
is given the responsibility and the 
opportunity to decide who is and who 
is not a genuine refugee. The intent is 
"to reduce the intake into the refugee 
process to a level which the Board can 
handle on an  ongoing basis." 
Management needs, not refugee 
needs, will determine the level at 
which the system will operate. We are 
in charge; we are in control; we 
manage. This is the ideology of the 
immigration civil service a s  
articulated by Joe Bissett, the 
Executive Director. 
But is this fair? The instructions, 
after all, state that the function of the 
new bills are to "combat abuse". "The 
thinking behind C-55 was that as 
claims were quickly decided 
negatively on  grounds of eligibility, 
credible basis, and by the Refugee 
Board after a full hearing, the word 
would get around that there was no 
advantage to be gained by bogus 
people claiming refugee status." This 
seems a very commendable strategy. 
But the strategy as outlined in the 
document suggests another more 
important goal - control, reduction of 
numbers, even if those numbers 
happen to be refugees. 
As the strategy document itself 
makes clear, Bill C-55 and Bill C-84 are 
just part of the control strategy. T he 
broader strategy includes the use of 
visas, fraudulent documentation 
detection, prevention of embarkation 
through fines on the airlines, etc. 
"Prevention of arrival is as important 
as as removal in reducing demand 
upon the refugee producing process." 
The document further notes that, "the 
target for the External Affairs 'out- 
take' from the system should be 
considerably higher than any target set 
for removals." 
This means that the department 
could eliminate, on a statistical count, 
the exact percentage of cases who 
could not prove that they were 
refugees. But this has, in fact, been the 
impact of the new legislation without 
the use of the Safe Country provision. 
Further, it would be the impact 
without the use of Preliminary 
Hearings. 
In other words, whether we like 
the strategy or not, whether we 
applaud or disapprove of its effects, 
the strategy has been successful. And 
it does not require either the Safe 
Country provision or the Preliminary 
Hearings to achieve that success. In 
other words, the civil servants can feel 
they have achieved their goals while 
allowing the Preliminary Hearings to 
whither away and without pressing to 
introduce the Safe Country provision, 
provided, of course, they are not 
absolutist in their goals. 
Principles 
One could, of course, insist the 
battle be joined on principles. Though 
the Safe Third Country provision has 
already been shelved as unworkable, 
the strategy document suggests that if 
it had been used as envisioned by the 
civil servants, then the United States 
would have been classified as a Safe 
Third Country, in spite of the fact that 
the USA had a terrible track record 
during the Reagan administration, 
according to its own courts and 
statistical records, for granting 
genuine Central American refugees 
refugee status in America. As the 
strategy document notes, "the return- 
to-safe-country provisions are 
expected to have a substantial impact 
on demand" along with. the deterrent 
factor of directing people back to the 
United States. In fact the strategy 
document went even further; "We 
want cases which are removable on 
the basis of arrival from a Safe Third 
Country ... to be detained because 
removal will be imminent." Detention 
was to be used not to protect 
Canadians but to increase the 
efficiency of the controllers. 
One could argue that the battle 
needs to be fought on principle to 
prevent the possible introduction of 
such measures as detention or the Safe 
Country provision. This may be 
valid, but it might be preferable to 
achieve what can be achieved where 
there is little disagreement on the 
basis of effectiveness, strategy and 
ideology. 
We did not need the Safe Third 
Country provision to reduce the 
intake significantly. We do not need 
the system of Preliminary Hearings to 
reduce the intake. In other words, the 
civil servants who want to control the 
intake into the system can boast that 
they have already achieved their goal 
(setting aside whether such a goal is 
desirable or not). 
There are already hints that the 
Preliminary Hearing System may 
follow the practice of a de  facto 
shelving without any admission by 
the architects who constructed the 
system that they were wrong. 
Raphael Girard, labelled as the chief 
architect, admitted as  much in a 
Southam News Interview by Joan 
Bryden reported in the Toronto Star on 
February 6th. As Girard is reported, 
"The government is also considering 
contesting fewer claims at the 
preliminary hearing so more go 
directly to a full hearing." They 
presently challenge less than 50 per 
cent, so if there is to be a significant 
decrease in challenges, the extra costs 
and delays as well as the risks of 
unfairness may lead to the reality that 
virtually all claims go to a direct 
hearing. 
Conclusion 
One might gloat over this victory. 
It appears that the government fight 
for the Safe Third Country provision 
and the preliminary hearings, which 
in themselves probably led to a two 
year delay in passing and 
implementing the new legislation and 
the consequent huge build-up in 
claims, was a total waste of time. But 
the point is not to gloat, but to 
implement d e  facto changes to 
improve the system. We trust these 
are in fact in process even if there is 
no public announcement to prevent 
any loss of face. 
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